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RECENT CASES.
ACTION FOR POSSESSION OF LAND-ADVERSE PossEssioN-TAING SUC-
CESSIVE POSSESSION.-JENNINGS V. WHITE, 51 S. E. 799 (N. C.).-
Held, that Wvhere the deed to one claiming title to land by adverse posses-
sion did not cover the land, the possession thereof by his grantor could not
be tacked on his possession for the purpose of showing a continuous adverse
possession for the statutory period.
Adverse possession must be continuous and when one seeks to unite to his
possession the possession of prior occupants the several titles must be con-
nected by purchase or descent. Without some privity between the succes-
sive occupants, the several possessions cannot be tacked together so as to
make continuity of possession. Smith v,. Reich, 87 Hun. (N. Y.) 287. Dif-
fereut entries, at different times, by different persons, between whom no
privity exists, are but a succession of trespasses. Rose v. Goodwin, 88 Ala.
390. Privity must be shown to have existed between them. Wheeler v.
Moody, 9 Tex., 372. And deed must be shown to tack possession of succes-
sive tenants. Johnson v. Nash, 15 Tex. 419. Each succeeding occupant
must show title under his predecessor and his possession must be referable to
the original entry. Wittv. St. Paul &- Northern Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 122;
but evidence of omission by mistake in drafting deed embracing land in ques-
tion is admissible to characterize the possession of grantor and grantee.
Smith v. Chapin, 3i Conn. 530.
BOYCOTT-INJUNCTIoN-ACTUAL INJURY.-VAN ILER PLAAT V. UNDER-
TAKERS' AND LIVzRYMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF PASSAIC, 62 ATL. (N. J") 453.-
Plaintiff claimed to be an educated embalmer and undertaker aid that
for two months he had been ready and willing to engage in business in Pat-
erson, N. J. He also alleges that defendant association and its members
have been and are preventing him by boycotting him and refusing to admit
him to membership and also refusing to hire to him hacks or hearses or to
sell him coffins or supplies. It is admitted that he neither has nor owns
appliances of any kind and that, at no time, has he had any corpse to care for;
also that the association has adopted a constitution and by-laws and
attempted to enforce them against him and that this amounts to criminal con-
spiracy. Plaintiff asks for an injunction and other relief.
Held, that as plaintiff had no business or establishment, even if the
alleged attempt to boycott has been made or threatened, plaintiff
has suffered no damage, nor, from evidence set forth, is he likely to.
It was not proven that there was any attempt to enforce the clause against
him and though there were an attempt, even if it were unlawful, the
action of the court would not be incited unless the personal or property
rights of plaintiff were affected.
CHARITABLE TRUSTs-CY Pnxs DOCTRINE.-MACKENZIE v. TRUSTEES OF
PRESBYTERY OF JERSEY CITY, 6I ATL., (N. J.) 1027.-A trust for public wor-
ship and instruction of indefinite number of persons according to the Presby-
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teriau faith, held to be a good charitable trust and enforceable either exactly,
or under the doctrine of Cy Pres.
A trust for a public charitable purpose will be sustained and enforced,
although there may be such indefiniteness in the declaration and description as
would render void an express private trust. Pomeroy Equity Jurzsfirudence,
(6th ed.)p. 585. In case of uncertainty, beneficiaries can always be identified
by extrinsic evidence. Hinckley v. Thacher, 139 Mass. 477. A gift to "mission-
ary, educational and benevolent enterprises" may be held valid as a charit-
able use. Thomson v. Norris, 2o N. J. Eq. 5; but not a devise to be
applied solely to "benevolent" purposes, such not being considered charity.
Chamberlain v. Stearns, xIi Mass. 267. The Cy Pres doctrine has been
the subject of much discussion and criticism in this country, and in some
states it has been altogether repudiated. White v. Fisk, 21 Conn. 3 i. But
the tendency of modern decisions is to follow this doctrine as restricted in
Jackson v. Phillifis, 14 Allen 539. By the above decision New Jersey form-
ally adopts the doctrine of Cy Pres, which had never been approved before
in that state. Bisrfham's Equity, see. 130.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS-UNCERTAINTY.-HEGEMAN v. ROOME, 62 ATL. RiP.
392 (N. J.).-Held, that a bequest to a trustee for the purpose of making such
distribution among religious, benevolent and charitable objects as he may
select is void, as vague and indefinite.
Charitable trusts are in their very conception uncertain. Pomeroy's
Eg. Jur. (6th ed.)sec. 987;Coggshellv. Pelton, 7 Johns Ch. 292; Saltonstallv.
Sanders, it Allen 446; Jackson v. Phillifis, 14 Allen 539. The decisions are
in utter conflict in limiting this uncertainty to reasonable bounds. Compare
Vesey v. Tamson, I S. & S. 69; and Dolan v'. Dolan, L. R. 5 Eq. 60; Treats
Afifi., 30 Conn. Ir3. In England if the trustee may at his discretion apply
the property to a charity or not the gift will fail. Morice v. Bishofi of Dur-
ham, 9 Ves. 404. The purpose must be sufficiently definite to allow the court
to exercise control over the trustee. Nash v. Mforly, 5 Beav. 177. Thus if
the purposes are discretionary or alternative the trust is void. Williams v.
Kershaw, 5 Cl. & F. iii; Vesey v'. Tamson, supra. These principles are
universally recognized where charitable trusts are supported in this country.
Rabeh v. Emerson, IoS Mass. 431. But many courts require greater certainty
than is required in England. White z. Ristel, 22 Conn. 3!. In New York
the doctrine has no place and funds dedicated to charitable purposes are
administered through corporate agencies sanctioned by legislative authority.
Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 603; Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N. Y., 254.
CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-VALIDITY.-MERRIIAN V. COVER
AND OTHERS, 51 S. E. 817 (VA.).-Held, that restraint is reasonable when it
is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in favor
of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the public.
At one time it was considered that the whole of the United States or an
entire state was an extent of space too extensive to be reasonable. More v.
Bonnet, 40 Cal. 25 r. Nobles z. Bates, 7 Cow. 307 (N. Y.). This doctrine
has been overruled by modern authorities, which lay more stress on the particu-
lar circumstances of each case. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 35 Hun. (N.
Y.) 421; Beal . Chase, 31 Mich. 490. So it was held to restrict the marble
business within a county was not unreasonable. Cobbs v. Niblo, 6 II. App.
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6o; while in Herreshofl v. Bontineau, 17 R. I. 3, it was held that the state
was too extensive for the restraint of a teacher of French; so in Bingham v,.
Maigne, 52 N. Y. Sup. 90, the territory of New York city and 250 miles
outside was too extensive a restriction on the manufacture of printers' rollers
and composition; also where no limit of space is designated the contract is
void. Curtis v. Gokey, 5 Hun. 355; Bishoft v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469;
Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co. v. Crane, i6o Mass. 50. In regard to con-
tracts of restraint unlimited as to time, it is said that this restraint, if unnec-
essary, will invalidate contract. Carrl v. Snyder, (N. J. Eq.) 26 Atl. 977;
Swanson v. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586. So a contract that a physician shall not "at
any time thereafter" engage in practice in a certain city is void, as otherwise
he might not practice after death of the otherparty. Mandeville v. Harmon,
42 N. J. Eq. 185. The general rule to-day is that a contract in restraint of
trade, to be supported, must be restricted as to territory, and the court be
able to see that considering the nature of the business in connection with the
territorial limits assigned, the limits designated are not unreasonable in
extent. Schwahn v. Holmes, 49 Cal. 665; Ellis v. Jones, s6 Ga. 504; Emjn-
son v. Bissinger, (Com. P1.) 9 Wkly Law Bul. 86 (Ohio); Daly v,. Smith,
3 8 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 158.
CORPORATION BOND IssUE-RESTRAINT OF STOCK SUBSCRIPTION.-WALL
V. UTAH COPPER Co., 62 ATL. (N. J. EQ.) 533.-Defendant company wishing
to develop its property, resorted to an issue of bonds secured by mortgage,
each bond "to be convertible at the option of the holder at any time within
five (5) years from the date thereof, into fifty (5o) shares of the value of ten
(1o) dollars each of the stock of the company." The bonds were $1000 each
and the stock was worth about $23 a share actual market value. The
company is a prosperous, growing concern. Complainant is a stockholder
and seeks to restrain the issue of the bonds on the ground that the proposed
action will deprive him of a clear and indisputable right which he has by law
to participate in any issue of new stock to an extent measured by the compar-
ative amount of his present holdings of stock and upon the same terms that
other parties shall participate therein. Injunction granted.
CORPORATIONS-RIGHTS OF PERSONS ENTITLED TO INCOME FROM SHARES-
STOCK DIVIDENDS.-IN RE STEVENS, 95 N. Y. SuPP. I084.-Held, that a stock
dividend declared on shares out of "surplus and undivided profits" belonged
to the life tenants and not to the remainderman and was properly credited to
•income."
This case follows the rule laid down in the leading case of McSouth v.
Hunt, 154 N. Y. 179, and is well supported. Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. St. 344;
Hite's Devisees v. Hite's E'r. 93 Ky. 257; The reason for the
rule being that such a dividend is only a form adopted by a
corporation of distributing to its shareholders its profits and accretion
instead of a money payment. 2 Thomtison, Corporations, Sec. 2192. But the
contrary is held in England and by high authority in this country, such divi-
dend being considered as forming part of the corpbus. Minot v. Pazne, 99
Mass. io , Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549. The theory of these decisions
is that a stock dividend is "merely a change in the form of ownership of cor-
porate capital and to give the new share certificates to the life tenant would
seem to rob the remainderman." 2'Thomfison, Corpborations, Sec. 2192. The
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cases are in direct conflict and irreconcilable. The rule as approved in the
present case is equitable and just while the latter doctrine seems to be
founded upon considerations of mere convenience. Pritchett v. Nashville
Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472.
CRIMINAL LAw.v-EVIDENCE-INSANITY-OPINIONS OF NON-EXPERTS.-
BOYD V. STATE, 88 S. W. 974 (AR.).-Held, that in a prosecution for mur-
der, witnesses who have detailed the acts of dtefendant may properly state
whether they considered him insane or not.
The question of the admissibilityof such evidence has been much debated
in this country. Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. X993. It has been held in some
states that such evidence by a non-expert is inadmissible even though based on
his own knowledge of facts. Com. v. Wilson, I Gray 337; Real v. Peopile,
42 N. Y. 270; O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 275. Other states have decided
that the opinion of a witness, not an expert, is competent upon the question
of the prisoner's sanity when such opinion is formed on facts within personal
knowledge of the witness. Genty v. State. N. J. L. 482; Chaice v. State, 31
Ga. 424; Jamison v. Peofile, 145 Ill. 357. The rule generally accepted by
the weight of authority to-day is that a witness, who has had an opportunity
of observing defendant may be asked, after stating facts within such obser-
vation whether from defendant's general appearance and conversation he was
at the time of sound mind. Wilkinson v. Pearson, 23 Pa. St. 147; Grant v.
Thomfison, 4 Conn. 403; Harrison v. Rowsan, 3 Wash. C. C. 580; Chaice v.
State, sufira. But a non-expert witness will not be permitted to give mere
opinions, disconnected from the facts on which such opinions are based. Far-
rel v. Brenan, 32 MO. 398; Eckert v. Flawry, 43 Pa. St 46. The tendency
in some states is to confine such non-experts to a mere statement of facts.
Real v. People, 42 N. Y, 270; Gewike v. State, 13 Tex. 568; Caleb v. State,
39 Miss. 722. Neither experts nor non-experts can be examined on conclusions
of law. State v. Klinger, 46 Mo. 224.
EVIDRNCE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONs.-HuMBER v.
VILLAGE OF ITHACA, io5 N. W. 9 (MiCH.).-Heid, that a question to a
physician, as to certain results being caused by an injury, which permitted
him to use knowledge of the injured person's condition not embodied in the
question, is unobjectionable if his conclusion is based upon conditions dis-
covered by him and previously fully detailed to the jury.
When the testimony of an expert is based upon personal observation there
are three rules applied in different courts. Hypothetical questions are in most
courts held tobe unnecessary. State v.Foote, 58 S. C.218;People v. Young, 151
N. Y. 219; Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. iz9. Some of these courts
hold, however, that all the facts from which the conclusion is drawn must
first be put in evidence as was done in this case. Van Deusen v. Newcomer,
sufira; Louisville Etc. R. R. Co. v. Falvey. 104 Ind. 419 . And in
rare cases the courts have required an advance hypothetical question. Hitch-
cock v. Burgess, 38 Mich. 507. The fallacy in the second class of cases is
well illustrated in Van Deusen z'. Newcomer, sufira., where the reason
given for the rule is the alleged impossibility of testing such an opinion by
calling other experts. There can be no such practical difficulty since all the
facts upon which the opinion is based may be brought out in cross-examina-
tion. Fuller v. The Mayor, 92 Mich. 201.
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EVIDENCE-NoN-ExPERT WITNESSES-INSANITY.-BETTs v. STATE, S 9 S.W.
413 (Tex.).-Held, that it was error to permit non-experts to give their opin-
ions that the defendant was sane, without first testifying as to the defend-
ant's conduct and the observations from which the non-experts derived their
conclusions.
This seems to be a much mooted question and to, be decided differently
in the several states. Some hold that if a change has taken place in the
defendant's conduct a witness, not an expert, could be permitted to testify as
to the defendant's insanity provided he had noticed the change of conduct.
State v. Wznter, 72 Iowa 627. It is proper to permit non-expert witnesses
to give their opinion of the defendant's insanity, though they may not give
any particular circumstances in support of their views. Cotrell v. Common-
wealth, 17 S. W. I4g. The reason for this is that a witness who has had
actual acquaintance with and knowledge of a person ought to know whether
or not that person was insane. But Collee v. State, 75 Ind. 51I; State v.
Erb, 74 MO. x9g; Parsons v. State, 87 Ala. 577, suostantially hold that non-
experts may give their opinions of the defendant's insanity but that they must
first state to the jury upon what facts these opinions are based. The reason
for this is that the jury should know the facts in order to ascertain what
weight they shall give to the testimony of the witness. This seems to be the
prevailing and better rule.
EVIDENCE-UNCORROBORATED CONFESSION.-BLACKER V. STATE, 105 N"
W. 302 (NEs.).-Held, that one cannot be convicted of a felony upon his
own unsupported extrajudicial confession.
Whether the uncorroborated confession of an accused in a criminal cases
is alone sufficient for a conviction is a question " which," says Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol. III, Sec. 2070, "for more than an hundred years has been left
culpably unsettled in English law." In 1784 there was a ruling that such a
confession sufficed. R. v. Wheeling, i Leach C. L. 24; but this was not final
authority; it remains, however, in the English and Irish courts except in cases
of homicide. So in 1887 it was held R. v. Sullivan, (Ire.) i6 Cox. C. 347, that
an uncorroborated confession was sufficient to sustain a conviction for larceny.
Since then the United States courts have been at liberty to adopt whatever
rule they saw fit. People v. Elliott, 9o Cal. 586; Cunningham v. Com.. 72
Ky. 14), held that a confession of a defendant, unless made in open court,
would not warrant a conviction unless accompanied by other. proof that a
crimehad been co-nmitted. The reason why caution is necessary in these
cases is that the defendant may have admitted things as true, such as in case
of forgery, writing another's name to a note, when he really intended by such
a confession to imply that the act was done rightfully. See also State v.
Knowles, 48 Iowa 598, for the same proposition. But to the contrary State.
v. Cowan, 29 N. C. 239; Stephen v. State, ii Ga. 225, held that any person
accused of an offense might be convicted upon his own voluntary confes-
sion although it was totally uncorroborated by any other proof. The best
rule, and the one supported by the weight of authority in this country, is that
there should be corroborating evidence. Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 217,
says "it best accords with the humanity of the criminal code."
HIGHWAY AGENT-LIABILITY OF TOWN FOR NEGLIGENCE.-WHEELER V.
TowN oF GILSUM, 62 ATL. 597 (N. H.).-A highway under control of
defendant town was overflowed, so as to prevent travel thereon, by reason of
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an ice jam on an adjoining river. Defendant's highway agent went out upon
the river and attempted to break up the jam with. dynamite. He did this so
carelessly that the ice bore down upon plaintiff's mill, which was down the
river a short distance, and completely demolished it. The dynamiting could
have been done in such a manner that the ice would have passed off easily.
The highway agent and other proper officers knew of the danger in time to
prevent the occurrence but took no steps to do so. Plaintiff claims
damages for the loss of his mill. Held, that no duty rested upon the town
to act for the protection of the plaintiff and its failure merely to take action
is not actionable negligence.
INFAMOUS CRIME-DEFINITION.-GARITEE v. BOND, 62 ATL. (MD.). 631.-
Appellant was named as executor of a will and on application to the Orphan's
Court of Baltimore for letters testamentary, the appellee. claiming to be the
adopted son of the testatrix, filed a petition asking that letters be refused,
because appellant bad been convicted of and imprisoned for an infamous
crime and had been disbarred as an attorney by the Supreme Bench of
Baltimore City for improper conduct involving moral turpitude. Appellant
admitted that he had been indicted and convicted of violation of an act of
Congress (U. S. Comp. St. r9ox, p. 3231), which provided "that no attorney
should take . . more than $io for preparing, etc ., . any pension
claim." It is claimed by appellant that this is not an infamous offense and that
nothing alleged would justify the court in refusing to grant him letters prayed
for.
Held, that the decision as to the infamy of the offense depended,
not on the punishment prescribed, but in the character of the offense itself
and that the statutory offense of which appellant was convicted did not
involve the requisite degree of moral turpitude to make the transgression an
infamous crime at common law. Appellant's contention was sustained
(Tie opinion cites a number of cases as to whether the character or funish-
ment of a crime is the criterion as to its infamy.)
INJUNCTIONS-INTERFERENCE WITH PATRONs-BoycoTT.-JENsEN v.
COOKS' AND WAITERS' UNION OF SEATTLE ET AL., 81 PAC. io69 (WASH.).-
Held, that former employees of an establishment may be restrained, by
injunction, from congregating about the entrance of the place of business for
the purpose of preventing, by force or pursuasion, the public from entering.
Employees who have quit their employment have no further interest in
the buisness of their former employer and no lawful right to interfere with
such business by attempting to induce other employees or the public from
transacting business with their former employer. Rundsen v. Benn, 123
Fed. 636. If they enter upon the premises except for the bona fide purposes
of trade they are trespassers. Foster v. Retail Clerks' I P. Ass',,., 39 Misc.
(N. Y.) 48. But, as a general proposition, the proprietor of a store cannot
restrain sympathizers from picketing the store provided they use no violence
or coercion; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ruef, X2o Fed. 1o2; unless their inter-
ference amounts to an unlawful conspiracy. Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council,
97 N. W. 663 (Minn). Nor will an injunction be granted unless it clearly
appears that there is a substantial pecuniary loss for which there is no ade-
quate remedy at law. Atkins v'. Fletcher, 55 Ati. 1o74 (N. J. Eq.). The
fact that their acts are punishable under the criminal law will not, however,
prevent the issuing of an injunction. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rue', sufira.
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INTOXICATING LIQUORS-CIVIL DAMAGE LAws-CONSTRUCTION-POST-
HuMous CHILD-RIGHT OF ACTION.-STATE EX REL. NIECE V. SALLE ET
AL., 74 N. E. IIII (IND.).-Held, that a statute, providing that any person
sustaining any injury to his means of support in consequence of use of
liquors unlawfully sold may sue the seller personally, gives to a child, born
after its father's death resulting from use of intoxicating liquors unlawfully
sold, the right to sue therefor.
Such right of action exists only by virtue of statute and not at common
law. Belding v. Johnson, I I L. R. A. 53; Woody vt. Coleman, 44 Iowa '9.
But the majority of the states have adopted statutes similar to the one under
consideration. Mead v. Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493; Quinlan v. Welch, 23 N.
Y. Supp. 963; Hocket v. Smelsey, 77 Ill. iio; Brockway v. Patterson, 72
Mich. 122; Rose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304; Raflerty v. Buckingham, 46 Iowa
195. It has been contended that such a statute does not include a post-humous.
child as the rights of the latter do not accrue until birth. Aliter v. St. Luke's
Hosphilal, 184 Ill. 359; Walker v. Railway Co., 26; N. Amer. Law Rev. so.
These cases, however, have to do with the personal rights of a child and must
be distinguished from the civil or property rights, which exist from the time
of the child's conception. i B1. Comm. 13o. The right to support from a
parent is such a right as was decided in Quinlan v. Welch, supra.; The
George and Richard, L. R. 3 Adm. and Ecc. 466.
NAVIGABLE WATERS-TITLE TO BED OF STREAbi.-KINKEAD V. TINGEON,
IO4 N. W. IO6I (Nx.).-Held, that the title to the bed of a navigable river is
in the state, and the rights of a riparian proprietor on such streams are
bounded by the banks of the river.
At common law, the title to the bed of a river in which the tide ebbs and
flows was in the Crown, but above the flow of the tide, belonged to the riparian
proprietors. Current law in England follows this ancient rule. Hudson v.
Ashby, (i896) 2 Ch. I. All of the American courts recognize the state owner-
ship of the beds of tidal streams but, in regard to rivers where the tide does
not flow but which are navigable in fact, there is a direct conflict. In some
jurisdictions riparian proprietors own to the fllum aguae. McCartney et al
v. C. &' E. R. R. Co., i12 Ill. 635; Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 379,
while in the following states ownership extends only to water line. Gilchrist's
Appeal, 1o9 Pa. 6o4; Cooley v. Golden, 117 Mo. 43, but may be to low water
mark. Palmer v. Williams, 132 Pa. 191. A distinction is made in some
courts between public and navigable streams. Steamboat Magnolia v. Mar-
shall, 39 Miss. 109-135. The Federal courts have refused to decide this
question, leaving the state to determine as between itself and riparian pro-
prietors. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661.
NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE.-CoLLINS V. W. JERSEY EXPRESS Co., 6
ATL. 675 (N. J.).-A servant of defendant while driving a wagon struck the
hind wheel of a wagon standing alongside the curb, forcing the wagon
against )the horse attached to it. The horse took fright and ran
away and after running along the same street for some distance turned
up another street where plaintiff was standing near a pile of loose boards
and he, to avoid being hit by the runaway, jumped aside and broke his leg
over the board pile. Plaintiff sued for damages and was non-suited. Held,
hat the case should be restored and intimated that plaintiff had a good case
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-COMPENSATION OF AGENT-COMMISSIONS.--GIBSON
v. BAILEY Co., 89 S. W. 59 7.- Held, that a general agent for the sale of
goods in a certain territory, who entices away from his principal orders in that
territory which the principal had previously acquired, is guilty of such mis-
conduct as to defeat his right to commissions.
General agent is one whom man puts in his place to transact all his busi-
ness of a certain kind, as to sell certain kind of ware. Walker v. Skifiwith,
x Meigs (Tenn.) 502. An agent must not conceal facts, in dealing with a
principal nor act adversely to the interests of his principal. Dennis v. McCagg,
32 Ill. 429; Hughes v. Washington, 72 Ill. 84. Good faith is the vital princi-
ple of the law of agency; without it the relations of principal and agent can-
not exist, and so jealously guarded is this principle that all departures from it
are esteemed frauds. Keighler v. Savage Affg. Co., 12 Md. 383; .Merry-
man v. David, 31 Ill. 404. For gross misconduct in the course of his agency,
or intentional frauds upon his principal, he may be held to forfeit all right to
compensation as respects any of the business of the principal into which
such frauds or misconduct shall have entered. Porter v. Silvers, 35 Ind.
295; Prescott v. White, I8 Ill. 322, And, if he makes any profit in the course
of his agency by any concealed management in selling on account of his prin-
cipal, the profits will belong exclusively to the principal. Cottom v. Holliday
59 Il. 176.
RAILROADS-CROSSING AcCIDENT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-ST. LouIs
I. M. & P. Ry. Co. v. HiTr ET AL., 88 S. W. 99o (ARK.).-Held, that
where a brakeman standing at a crossing which was blocked by a standing
frieght train, told plaintiffs, who were waiting to drive over the crossing, that
it would soon be clear, and when the train cleared the crossing the brakeman
was standing nearby and in a position where he could see the tracks better
than plaintiffs could, the latter could take into consideration the fact that the
brakeman was in a favorable position to see any danger and would doubtless
give them warning thereof. Battle and Riddicks, JJ., dissenting.
Weight of authority holds that it is the duty of a traveller approaching a
ailroad crossing to make vigilant use of eyes and ears for the approach of a
train before proceeding over. Davis v. Ry., 47 N. Y. 4oo; .Ry.v. Righter
42 N. J. L. 18o; By. v. Masely, 57 Fed. Rep. 921; Wilds v. Ry., 29 N: Y.
315; R y. v. eal, 73 Pa. St. 5o7. Exercise of some care is not sufficient. Ry.
v. Burke, 57 N. Y. St. Rep. 7. This rule does not require plaintiff, if in a
team, to get out and go on the track for a better view. Davis v. By., sufira.
One cannot depend upon another's senses to give warning of
danger. Wiwirowski v. Ry., 124 N. Y. 420. Fact that a
flagman at a railroad crossing signals a person to cross does
not relieve such person from duty of looking and listening for train. Ry.
v. Gustavson, 21 Col. 393; Cadwallader v. Ry., 128 Ind. S8; Renner v. By.,
46 Fed. 344. Although plaintiff has right to assume that defendant will do
his duty in giving signals, yet he cannot rely on that assumption and thus
relieve himself from exercising proper care. Shaw v. Jewett, 86 N. Y. 616:
Ry. v. Righter, supra; Ry. v. Masely, suj6ra.
SALEs-REsCISSION BY Bu R-WAivR OF RIGHT TO RESCIND.-WARD V-
MARVIN, 62 ATL. 46 (VT.).-Held, that where the buyer of a horse; after dis.
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eovering fraud of the seller, and after being assured by the seller that. if the
horse was not as represented, he would make it right, continues to use the
horse as his own, he thereby waived his right to rescind the contract.
A purchaser, upon discovery of a fraud, may treat the contract as void-
able and may rescind by returning the property purchased. State v'. Hen-
dricks, i Cent. Rep. (N. J.) 451. But the right to rescind must be exercised
within a reasonable time after the fraud is discovered or the time when it
should have been discovered. Young v. Arntze, 86 Ala. ix6. The continu-
ing dealing with the property purchased in reference to the fraudulent transac-
tion as if the contract were subsisting and binding is evidence of a waiver of
the fraud and the election to treat the contract as valid and still subsisting;
Oakey v. Cook, 4z N. J. Eq. 350; unless what is done is merely for the purpose
of saving the plaintiff from further loss, without any purpose to give up what-
ever right he may have either at law or in equity to rescind. Montgomery v.
Pickering, 166 Mass. 227. And even one whose tender of chattels for the
purpose of rescinding is refused, and who takes it back and uses it as his own,
thereby waives the benefit of his tender, and his remedy is an action at law
for damages. McCulloch '. Scott, 52 Ky. 72.
TELEGRAPHS-MEssAGEs-DELAY.-HAmRIcK v. WESTERN UNIoN TELEGR PH
Co., 52 S. E. a32 (N. C.).-Held, that where delivery of a message informing
plaintiff of the serious illness of his wife was delayed for a period of 28
hours, and plaintiff was informed of such delay before he started to his wife's
bedside, it was no defense that, in view of the fact that his wife ultimately
recovered, he was not damaged, but was in fact relieved of 28 hours anxie-
ty on account of the delay.
This decision is in accord with previous decisions in same state. Thomp-
son v. W. U. Tel. Co., xo7 N. C. 449. And also in harmony with the decis-
ions of a few other states. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Cunnirgham, 99 Ala. 314; Chap-
man v. W. U. Tel. Co., go Ky. 265. But beyond all doubt the above decis-
ions are contrary to the weight of authority which holds that damages
cannot be recovered from a telegraph company for mental suffering resulting
from simple negligence in the prompt delivery of a message announcing the
dangerous illness of a relation, as such damages are too uncertain and specu-
lative. Chase v. Telegraph Co., 44 Fed. 554 The law of the state to which
the message is sent will govern whether a recovery shall be had or not.
Gray v. Telegraph Co., 9I Am. St. Rep. 7o6. These case must be distin-
guished from those in which an actual loss is suffered. Bodkin v. Telegraph
Co., 31 Fed. 134.
TORT-DAMAGES-SPECIFIC PaooF.-ERIuE R. R. Co., 62 ATL., 482
(N. J.).-Plaintiff in a tort action in basing his claim for damages testifies
that hetookin $i,ooo to $i,ioo per annum gross. He produced no books nor
any evidence as to the expenses of his business or of the proportion of the
expenses to the gross income. The court left it to the jury to award damages
based on the plaintiff's statement. Held, that there being no proof of loss of
profits in the business of the plaintiff which the jury could, under the evidence,
arrive at with reasonable certainly, it was error for the trial judge to submit
the question of the class of damages to the jury, and he should have charged
as requested by defendant. Fort, J., citing East Jersey Water Co. v. Bige-
low 6o N. J. L. 201.
RECENT CASES.
TRUSTS-CoNsTRucInV TRUSTS.-HEDDLESTON E, AL. V. STONER ET AL. 105
N. W. 56 (IowA).-Held, that the breach of an express trust to hold title
for another is not fraud on which equity will declare a constructive trust.
A trust results from the acts and not from the agreements of the parties
and no trust results merely from breach of a parole contract. Perry on
Trusts, § 134; 2 Story Eq. Juris. § i2oi a. If one agrees to purchase land and
give another an interest in it and he purchases and pays his own money and
tales title in his own name, no trust results. Williard v. Williard, 56 Pa. St.
iig; Duffy v Masterson, 44 N. Y. 557; Hunt v. Friedman, 63 Cal. 5io.
But if the promise which induced the agreement was fraudulently made the
breach of such a promise becomes a fraud from which a trust will arise.
Perry on Trusts §§ 134, 171. A trust created by such fraud need not be in
writing. Statute of Frauds, § 8. There are some cases which hold that
mere breach of contract is sufficient fraud to raise a trust in favor of the
party defrauded. Chastain v. Smith, 3o Ga. 96; Ousan v. Cown. 22 Wis. 329.
But the weight of authority is to the contrary, and in harmony with the de-
cision rendered in the present case. Loomis v. Loomis, 6o Barb. 22; An-
drew v. Andrew, 114Iowa 524.
UNFAIR COMPETITIoN-RIGHT TO PROTECTION IN EQUITY.-SIEGERT v. GAN-
DOLpI, 139 FED. 917. A manufacturer of "Augostura Bitters" which, in its ad-
vertisements, is said to contain no harmful or intoxicating ingredients, when
in fact such bitters are composed of more than forty per cent alcohol, held,
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and not entitled to aid of court of
equity against alleged unfair competition.
Equity as a rule will not tolerate any imitation of another's trade mark
or trade name whereby the public is liable to be deceived. Relief has been
afforded when use was made of "Canadian Rye Whiskey" for "Canadian Club
Whiskey," Hiram Walker, & Sons v. Ni'kolas, 79 Fed. 955; "Six Big Tailors"
for "Six Little Tailors," Mossier v. Jacobs, 66 Ill. App. 571; "Holsteter"
"Hostetter," Hostetter v. Vowinkle, I Dill 329; "Saphia" for "Sapolio,"
Enoch Morgan's Sons v. Schwachofer, 55 How. Prac. 37. No injunction
however against "Baco-Curo" for "No-to-Bac," Sterling Co. v. Eureka Co., 70
Fed. 704. Arbitrary numbers and letters may be used as trademark, but not
"I. X. L." Lichtenstein v. Mellis, 34 Am. Rep. 592. (Ore). In no case, how-
ever, will trademark be protected if owner has knowingly misrepresented
the article to the public: Medicine Co. v. Wood, xo8 U. S. 218; nor will there
be any relief where medicine was advertised as "Syrup of Figs" but its prin-
cipal ingredient was senna; California Fig Syrup Co. v. Putnam, 66 Fed. 750;
nor where whiskey was guaranteed to be "pure and unadulterated" but con-
tained 35 per cent of other blends. Kraus v. los. R. Peebles Sons Co., 58 Fed.
585. Similarly a court will not interfere between manufacturers of quack
medicines; Heath v. Wright, 3 Wall. 141; nor when word "Habana" is placed
on cigar label, when cigars in fact were merely Havana filler. Solis Cigar
Co. v. Pozo, 25 Am. St. 279 (Colo.). But misrepresentation must always be
more than trivial inaccuracies or "trade talk," Clark Thread Co. v. Armitage,
67 Fed. 896.
WITNESSES-CREDIBILITY-RAPE-B VIDENCE.- STATE V. SIMPSON, 62 ATL.,
(VT.) 14.-Held, in a prosecution for rape on a female under the age of con-
sent, defendant was not entitled to prove, to affect her credibility as a witness,
previous unchastity with other men.
Proof of reputation for unchastity is usually held incompetent in order
to impeach credibility. Peofile v. Mills, 94 Mich. 630; CoM. Vi. Churchill,
52 Mass. 538. Although opposite doctrine is upheld in a few states. Wright v.
Kansas City, 187 Mo. 678; Weathers v. Barksdale, 3o Ga. 888. So also as to
general moral character of witness. Taylor v. Taylor's Estate (Mich.) o.
N. W. 832; McKelvey Evidence p. i6o; contra, Helm v. Com. (Ky.) 81 S. W.
270. In a case of rape when lack of consent is material, proof of general
reputation of complainant for unchastity and former improper acts with
defendant is always allowed as tending to show acquiescence. Com. v. Ken-
dall, 113 Mass. 21o. But as to whether specific acts of incontinence with other
men can be proved the courts are in conflict. Coin. v. Harris. 131 Mass. 336;
State v. Foshner, 43 N. H. 89; contra, State v. Reed, 39 Vt, 417; Brennan v.
Peo,6le, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 171.
